The Problem of France and its Effect on the Potsdam Agreements by Anderson, Larry Keith
Fort Hays State University 
FHSU Scholars Repository 
Master's Theses Graduate School 
Summer 1962 
The Problem of France and its Effect on the Potsdam Agreements 
Larry Keith Anderson 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anderson, Larry Keith, "The Problem of France and its Effect on the Potsdam Agreements" (1962). 
Master's Theses. 731. 
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/731 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository. 
THE PROBLEM OF FRANCE AND ITS 
EFFECT ON THE POTSDAM AGREEMENTS 
being 
A thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty 
of the Fort Hays Kansas State College in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts 
by 
Larry Keith Anderson, A. B. 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
ABSTRACT 
France , in the Potsdam Agreements , was accorded 
equal power in the occupation and control of defeated 
Germany with the Big Three . Yet, the French were not 
bound, in any way , to the Potsdam Agreements by which 
the occupation and control of defeated Germany was to 
proceed. The purpose of this study has been to discover 
how and why this omrnission occurred and its effect upon 
the Pot s dam design . 
Pursuance of this study led to an investigation of 
Big Three wartime summit meetings and of Big Three rela-
tions with France during the various phases of the war. 
From June of 1940 to October of 1944 the Big Three were 
faced with the problem of finding and recognizing a French 
Government representative of the French people . Following 
the recognition of the Provisional Government of France 
on October 23 , 1944, the three great powers were faced 
with de Gaulle's chauvinistic and ambitious plans for him-
self as well as his nation . 
Full responsibility for the obstruction, however, 
cannot be delegated to France alone , for the responsibility 
must be shared by all four nations. By their attitude, the 
Soviets implied a continual belief in French inferiority , 
and Russia became a new symbol of danger to French security. 
Great Britain and the United States, although the main 
supporters of French rights, failed to support France 
adequately when she needed it most. 
The result was the frustration of the Potsdam 
design for the occupation and control of defeated Germany. 
The planned coordinated approach was replaced by a national 
zonal approach. The long-range eff ect can be discerned in 
the Berlin wall and the lack of unity between the Western 
powers; both of which are, in part, a result of the French 
obstruction following Germany's surrender. 
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PREFACE 
An interest in the French problem was acquired 
during a seminar on the "Causes of the Cold War." Part 
of the material read for that seminar was an excerpt from 
James Paul Warburg 1 s Germany: Key to Peace entitled 
"Onset of the Cold War." In this excerpt, Mr. Warburg 
credited Great Britain and the United States with the 
major political blunder of allowing the French equal 
power with the Big Three in the occupation and control of 
defeated Germany without binding France in any way to the 
Potsdam Agreements. 
An attempt has been made to answer several 
questions. First, what was the origin and n2ture of the 
French problem, and what were the attitudes of the major 
powers toward France? This question led to an investi-
gation of Big Three wartime summit meetings and the 
conditions under which the delegations assembled for the 
Potsdam Conference, as well as an investigation of the war-
time relations between France and the Big Three. Se cond, 
why were the French excluded from the Potsdam Conference? 
Finally, who was to blame for French obstructive ac t ivity 
following Germany's surrender, and what was the result of 
that activity? 
My conclusions are the result of an investigation 
ii 
of publications of the United States State Department and 
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, memoirs and diaries of the 
outstanding personalities of the period, and major 
secondary works concerning the subject. 
The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of 
Dr. Eugene R. Craine, Dr. William Darrell Stump, Mr. Don B. 
Slechta, and Dr. Roberta Stout, all of whom have read the 
manuscript and offered helpful sugg es t ions. To the library 
staff at Forsythe Library, the writer wishes to express his 
gratitude for their patience throughout the course of this 
study. 
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BACKGROUND OF THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE 
The Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945) was 
the last of the wartime conferences between the leaders of 
the three great powers: Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States. The leaders of these nations had, 
with their various advisers, met twice before in attempts 
to settle problems which confronted them as allies in a 
world-wide conflict. 
At Teheran (November 28-December 1, 1943) the three 
leaders met for the first time. Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill represented Great Britain; Premier Joseph Stalin, 
the Soviet Union; and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
the United States. The Communique issued at t he end of 
this conference expressed the determination that the three 
nations would "work together in war and in the peace that 
will follow.nl At this conference the basic cooperative 
military strategy for the successful completion of the war, 
particularly against Hitler's Germany, was discussed and 
decided. Here the Soviets obtained one of their chief de-
sires; an agreement by their Western allies of a definite 
1Department of State, In Quest of Peace and Security: 
Selected Doucuments on American Foreign Policy~ ~-122.!, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951, p •• 
date for the launching of the much desired second front. 
Although some attention was accorded to postwar problems, 
these discussions were brief and vague. The American 
leaders were primarily concerned with one aim at that 
stage of the conflict; the winning of the war. They 
tended to postpone discussion of postwar problems until 
a later date. 
At Yalta, the Crimea Conference (February 4-11., 
1945), the leaders of the three great powers met for the 
second time. Conditions in the European theatre of war 
had changed markedly since the meeting at Teheran two 
2 
years earlier. Obviously, the German armies were nearing 
the end of their efforts. Only a matter of time separated 
the Allied forces from total victory in this theatre. By 
the early 1950 1 s the general theme developed in the United 
States that the Western delegates were on the J 1sing side 
at this conference; that the free world was sold-out to 
the advantage of the Soviet Union. George N. Crocker., 
writing of the conference caustically remarked that "drink-
ing-bout diplomacy had served the Russians well. 112 James 
F. Byrnes, a member of the American delegation to the con-
ference, remarked that he "marveled that he Woosevel'fil 
ma.de such a good presentation apparently with little 
2George N. Crocker, Roosevelt's Road to Russia 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), p. 25.3. 
3 
pr paration. 11 3 Certainly the results of this historic 
meeting were different than desired by the Western leaders, 
but not all the fruit of the tree went to the Russians . 
The Soviet leaders also agreed to decisions not in accord-
ance with their expre.s desires; the most notable being 
their agreement to include France in the postwar occupation 
and control of defeated Germany. 
A different perspective was cast on the results of 
the Yalta Conference by Captain Thornycroft in a speech to 
the British House of Commons, February 28, 1945,4 in which 
he expressed an opinion that the control of Eastern Europe 
had passed to the Soviets and that the Yalta Agreement was 
the "best settlement possible." This was merely an obser-
vation of a fact. Soviet armies controlled Eastern Europe, 
and to dislodge them against their wishes would have been 
a most difficult task. 
Regardless of the various viewpoints expressed on 
the subject of Yalta , an undeniable fact was that the con-
ference ended without concrete decisions being made on a 
number of issues. James Paul Warburg m intains that "the 
3This is a reference to the 
health at Yalta and a reply to the 
went to the conference unprepared. 
One Lifetime (New York: Harper and 
state of the Pre ident's 
accusation that Roosevelt 
James F. Byrnes, All in 
Brothers, 1958), p~5b. 
4Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: American 
Foreign Policy, 1945-1960 (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., 19b2}, pp. 139-1~3. 
communique issued fat the close of the conference) ••• showed 
clearly, by what it did not say, that the three leaders 
4 
were far from seeing eye-to-eye concerning the post-surrender 
treatment of Germany. 11 .5 Similar views must also have been 
held by Prime Minister Churchill and President Harry s . 
Truman, for in a message to Churchill (May 14, 1945) 
Truman stated that "I am in full agreement with you 
[ChurchilU that an early tripartite meeting is necessary to 
come to an understanding with Russia. 11 6 
While there was agreement for an early meeting of the 
Big Three, there was a divergence of opinion as to when the 
meeting should be held. Churchill pressed for the middle 
of June or the first of July at the latest. His anxiety 
was founded on the fear that the American Government would 
agree to a withdrawal of their forces from the central part 
of Germany, thus leaving that entire area under ~oviet con-
trol. The Prime Mini ster believed that should such a step 
be taken the Western leaders would have nothing to bargain 
with at Potsdam II and all the prospects of the future peace 
.5James Paul Warburg , Germany: ~ey to Peace (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press , 19.53, p. 17. 
6 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States Diplomatic P!3is : the Conference of Berlin 
(the Potsdam Conference), 19 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1960), Vol. I, p. 11. 
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of Europe might well go by default. 11 7 
Churchill's most forceful arguements, however, could 
not prevail over Truman's caution. Only a few months 
earlier Truman had been elected Vice-President of the 
United States. Suddenly he found himself filling a vacancy 
in the Presidency, a promotion which left him face d with 
the responsibility of helping make decisions which would 
create a peaceful world without the benefit of full knowl-
edge of previous discussions and agreements between the 
leaders of the three major powers. His conviction was, 
therefore, that time was needed in order to inform himself 
on existing conditions and past negotiations. Thus, he 
notified Churchill (June 1, 194.5 ) that "after full consid-
eration July 1.5 was the earliest for him, and that arrange-
ments were being made accordingly. 118 
Premier Stalin was in no hurry to have th P proposed 
meeting, and Truman, in his note of June 1 to Churchill, 
informed the Prime Minister that Stalin was in agreement 
with the July 1.5 date. The Prime Minister had no choice 
but to accept the later date. 
When the delegations assembled at Potsdam noticable 
changes in their composition, in comparison to earlier con-
7w1nston s. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. VI of 
The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1953), p. 602. -
8Ibid., p. 599. 
6 
ferences, were in evidence. Harry Truman had succeeded 
Franklin D. Roosevelt as the American leader. As noted 
above, he had delayed the meeting to inform himself on 
earlier conferences. Still , he was handicapped by taking 
over an unfamiliar hand in a game for high stakes. 11 The 
Secretary of State (la.mes F~ Byrnes, had taken office only 
a few days before sailing. 119 While he had attended the 
Yalta Conference, this was his first appearance in the 
capacity of Secretary of State . He was, therefore, un-
familiar with a number of i s sues with which he would have 
to deal and was forced to prepare himself as best he could 
on the trip to Potsdam. 
Other familiar faces were absent from the American 
delegation. Harry Hopkins, who had served Roosevelt as a 
most trusted adviser throughout most of the war, remained 
in the United States in an attempt to regain hi ' health.lo 
His absence was a handicap to the United States delegation 
because his vast experience in dealing with the Soviets was 
not available at a crucial time. Most of the remainder of 
the civilian members of the American delegation were career 
officers of the State Department and the Foreign Service; a 
9Herbert Feis, Between Peace and ar: the Potsdam 
Conference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press , 
1960) , p. 160. 
lOibid. 
7 
group not included as policy makers at previous conferences. 
Finally, Averell Harriman, the United States Ambassador in 
Moscow, had to suggest himself to the President as a member 
of the delegation which "was indicative of the desire of 
both the President and the Secretary of State to leave them-
selves free to make up their own minds about the spirit in 
which to deal with the Russians."11 He was 11 given little 
to do after arriva1. 11 12 
The British delegation was noticably changed in the 
persons of their two major delegates. Winston Churchill 
and Anthoney Eden began the conference in their respective 
roles of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, but the 
British election returns, announced in the middle of the 
conference, replaced Churchill with Clement Attlee and Eden 
with Ernest Bevin. Yet, the British successors were more 
fortunate than their American colleagues for, as 1~aders 
of the loyal opposition party, they had been kept fairly 
well informed in the development of current situations and 
had had constant information on current British policy. 
Still, Attlee and Bevin were faced with the problem of 
taking over the reins of leadership in the middle of a 
crucial event. 
Herbert Feis quite aPtly summed up the Soviet 
llrbid., p. 161. 
12~. 
delegation to the conference with the statement that, "Of 
the Soviet group all that need be said is that Stalin was 
there, and [v. MJ Molotov [soviet Foreign Secretarif, 
always present •••• 11 13 
It would be no exaggeration, then, to say that the 
Soviets held a definite advantage throughout the ensuing 
discussions. Only they had been present at all of the 
previous Big Three meetings. On the fine points which 
arose during the discussions, it was mainly to Stalin and 
Molotov that the conferees were forced to turn for inter-
pretations of previous agreements and partial agreements. 
A wide range of topics, including a number of agreements 
"in principle" previously made and then deferred for final 
agreement, comprised the agenda. 
8 
Several of the issues at Potsdam have been given wide 
coverage in the years since that conference. The "Polish 
question" has been argued by a number of authorities. 
This issue, along with that of reparations, was a carry-
over from the Yalta Conference. Other issues at Potsdam 
concerned war criminals, minority populations, plans for 
future peace conferences, and the problem of devising a 
design for the occupation and control of defeated powers. 
There are two aspects of the Potsdam Conference, 
however, of which little has been written. One is the 
9 
exclusion of France from the conference, and the second is 
the manner in which the French viewed the Potsdam decisions 
and their reaction to those agreements. Before these 
aspects are discu ssed, however, an investigation must be 
made of the position of France in relation to the three 
great powers. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BIG THREE AND FRANCE 
France entered World War II as one of the strongest 
nations on the European continent . Yet, in six weeks of 
May and June, 1940, the German military machine rolled 
across France and forced an armistice from that nation. 
This event marked the beginning of the "French problem" 
which faced British, Soviet and United States Governments 
during and after World War II . 
An immediate question regarding France was that of 
discovering which leader should be recognized as repre-
senting the government of France . In 1940, there were 
two possible candidates; 1 one the Vichy government which , 
/. under the leadership of Marshal Henri Petain, had moved 
the site of the French Government to North Africa f ollow-
ing the armistice . The second candidate was General 
Charles de Gaulle who ultimately became the leader of the 
Free French resistance movement . 
American policy supported the Vichy faction from 
the outset . William Leonard Langer maintains that Vichy, 
lF. Roy Willis , The French in German~ , !.ili_-~ 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press , 1962, p . 2 . Here-
i nafter cited as Willis , The French in Germany. 
11 
at the time, seemed to offer more advantages than did de 
Gaulle; that de Gaulle hardly offered an alternative. 2 It 
would be difficult to insist that a policy of support for 
de Gaulle, as a source of intelligence about Axis plans, 
should have been instigated from the start because of his 
distance from the scene of action. On the other hand, the 
Vichy government was known to have pro-Fascist leanings; 
but the fact that they were in contact with the Axis powers 
made them valuable to the Allies. Through their contact 
with the Axis leaders, the Vichy officials became ac-
quainted with political and military information of the 
highest value,3 much of which was passed on to the American 
Government. What could de Gaulle offer in the medium of 
information? 
F. Roy Willis reported the extent of de Gaulle's 
following in June of 1940 to be "some three thousa nd men. 11 4 
He further stated that 
••• his strength increased considerably during the 
following months. By September 1941 several of the 
French colonies had put themselves under Free French 
control, including Chad, Cameroon, Ubangi, Middle Congo, 
and Oceania. 
Willis also pointed out that it was at this time that de 
2william Leonard Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), P• 394. 
3Ibid., p. 387. 
4w111is, The French in Germany, p. 2. 
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Gaulle organized the French National Committee.5 While de 
Gaulle's followin g was continually growing, however, it 
should be remembered that his headquarters had been 
established in London, and that his forces made little or 
no contact with the enemy. De Gaulle, therefore, could not 
replace Vichy as a source of information concerning enemy 
movements. 
Another basic factor which led to the American policy 
of support for Vichy was Roosevelt's distrust of de Gaulle . 
He considered de Gaulle's pretensions false, his contribu-
tions to the war small, and his ambitions dangerous. 6 
Roosevelt was, therefore, opposed to recognition of the 
Gaullist faction until that action became an absolute 
necessity. The American Government thus became the major 
stumbling block to a formal recognition of the Gaullist 
movement. In the early phases, both President Roo~evelt 
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull preferred to maintain 
diplomatic relations with Vichy, "thereby strengthening 
Petain 1 s will to resist Hitler's demands and maintaining 
a listening-post in the heart of Nazi-controlled Europe . 11 7 
51.Q1Q... 
6Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: the War 
They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, N.J::- --
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 137. Hereinafter 
cited as Fels, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. 
7w1111s, The French in Germany, p. 3. 
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By the end of 1942, however, de Gaulle could no 
longer be ignored. The Vichy government continually disre-
garded the wishes of the Allies and moved closer to open 
collaboration with Nazi Germany. By the time operation 
TORCH was launched in North Africa, Marshal P6tain had 
become a mere figurehead. Winston Churchill's writing 
contains evidence that at the time of the invasion of North 
Africa the reins of authority in the Vichy government were 
held by Pierre Laval and Admiral Jean Darlan.8 As the 
Allied invasion forces drew near North Africa, the Germans 
contacted Vichy and offered aid against the invaders. But 
/ Laval, not Petain, was contacted. Laval accepted German aid 
with Darlan suggesting the areas to which the aid should be 
directed. All the arrangements had been made and several 
/. hours had passed before Petain was awakened and informed of 
the conditions and decisions.9 
The question also arose anew as to whether the French 
people supported Vichy or whether they supported de Gaulle. 
Earlier reports reaching Washington from sources inside 
France did not indicate that de Gaulle was supported by 
8winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Vol. IV of The 
Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19501, 
pp. 622-623. Hereinafter cited as Churchill, The Hinge of 
Fate. 
9Ibid. , p. 623. 
14 
large numbers of French people. 10 Yet, by the end of 1942, 
it was becoming evident that the support of the French 
people lay more with de Gaulle than with the Vichy faction. 
But even with these changing conditions Roosevelt refused 
to accept any French authority headed solely by de Gaulle . 
As late as the summer of 1944, reports Willis, "Roosevelt 
was still convinced that de Gaulle was only a minor figure 
in the French resistance movement. 1111 Besides, who would 
deny that de Gaulle was both ambitious and chauvinistic? 
General Henri Giraud, on the other hand, was much more 
welcome to Roosevelt than was de Gaulle, "since Giraud 
took every opportunity to point out that he had no politi-
cal aims. 11 12 Giraud proved highly acceptable to the 
American leaders from the point of view that any French 
authority recognized at the time was to be temporary and 
would have to be replaced by a government duly elec t ed by 
the French people following the liberation of France . 
It was, therefore, largely at the insistence of the 
American Government that in June of 1943, Generals Giraud 
and de Gaulle met in North Africa in an attempt to work 
out the differences between them. On June 3, an agreement 
on vital points was reached by the two generals, and a 
lOwillis, The French in Germany, p . 4. 
11Ibid. 
12Ib1d., p. 5. 
French Committee of National Liberation was set up which 
included Giraud, de Gaulle, General Georges Catrou.x, and 
certain members of the Gaullist Committee from London, 
which had been dissolved when de Gaulle left for North 
Africa. A de facto withdrawal of recognition from Vichy 
was especially noticeable by the exclusion of the former 
Vichy governors from the new body, 11 which was now to be 
15 
the central provisional administration of Fighting France 
and her Empire until the end of the war. 1113 The American 
leaders agreed to accept this combination under the joint 
leadership of de Gaulle and Giraud. While the authority 
claimed by the Committee was all-inclusive, they had agreed 
to 
••• relinquish its powers to the provisional govern-
ment which will be constituted in conformity with the 
laws of the republic as soon as the liberation of 
metropolitan territory permits, ~nd at the latest 1 pon 
the total liberation of France.14 
The problem of recognition still remained unsolved, 
however, as the governments of the three main Allies were 
unable to agree upon a common basis of treatment of the 
French Committee. Feis relates that 
Roosevelt had continued to refuse to consider any 
form of public statement that would accord or imply 
11 recognitionn of the Committee's claim to speak and 
13winston Churchill, Closing the Ring , Vol. V of The 
Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19~ 
p. 173. -
lli.Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin , p. 138. 
act for the whole of the French people. He had been 
afraid that de Gaulle's growing control ••• might inter-
fere with our military and political plans. He was 
determined, in the expression he had taken to using, 
not to give de Gaulle a "white horse" on which he 
could ride into Frange and make himself the master of 
a government there.l~ 
16 
The American Government, therefore, continued to frustrate 
de Gaulle's desires. What, though, were the attitudes of 
our allies? 
From the very beginning the British had favored 
collaboration with and support of the Gaullist movement. 
When Prime Minister Churchill visited France before the 
signing of the armistice in 1940, he left with the con-
viction that 11 de Gaulle was the one man with the will to 
lead France to victory. "~16 The British Government com-
mitted itself to relations with the Free French by an 
agreement on August 7, 1940, which "recognized that an 
exclusively French force under the cormnand of Gener4l 
de Gaulle was being recruited on British soil, and announced 
that the costs of maintaining this force would be borne 
by the British Government. 11 17 Still the British did not 
aspire to push Vichy to open hostility. 
Churchill's own views about Vichy seemed to be 
somewhat mixed. His distrust for that faction was clearly 
l5rbid., p. 315. 
16willis, _'.£.he French in Germany., p. 2. 
1 7Ibid., p. 3. 
17 
displayed by a message to President Roosevelt , February 7, 
1942, upon hearing of pending negotiations between the 
United States and Vichy concerning continued Vichy control 
of Madagascar , asking that no guarantees for the non-
occupation of Madagascar be given. 18 His major fear, 
apparently, was that should the Japanese desire that island 
they could take over with little or no resistance from 
Vichy. 1 9 Yet, the British deemed Vichy to be important 
enough to the defense of North Africa that they offered to 
send air and ground aid to that area.20 The importance 
ascribed to Vichy is probably best portrayed by Churchill 
in his chapter dealing with the final shaping of TORCH. 21 
The prevailing attitude of both the British and American 
officials was th~t the extent to which t he French in North 
Africa resisted the Allied landing would greatly influence 
the success of that landing. Also, Churchill paid t ribute 
to the efforts of Admiral Darlan in re aucing French 
resistance to the Allied activities in the African theatre. 
In Churchill's own words, Darlan "brought to Anglo-American 
allies exactly what was needed, namely, a French voice 
l8churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 222. 
19Ibid., p. 223. 
20Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
21For a full discussion, see The Hinge of Fate, 
pp. 525-548. 
18 
which all French officers and officials in this vast 
theatre, now plunged in the war, would obey." 22 
There are also grounds for believing that part of 
Churchill's acquiesence to the American policy of sup-
porting Vichy was the simple fact that he did not 
thoroughly trust de Gaulle . In 1941, for examble, the 
Free French seized the islands of St . Pierre and Miquelon 
after giving assurance that they would not do so. 23 This 
action embarrassed both the British and the Americans who 
conveyed this assurance to Vichy. At the Washington Con-
ference, May 12-25, 1943, President Roosevelt clearly 
displayed his strong feeling against de Gaulle by con-
tinually handing to Churchill accusing documents against 
the Frenchman's activities. Churchill's own indecision 
concerning de Gaulle at the time have since been expressed 
in the following manner: 
I was at this time most indignant with de Gaulle . I 
felt our continued support of him mi ght lead to an 
estrangement between the British and United States 
Governments and that no one would like this better than 
de Gaulle . I brought all this forcibly to the notice 
of my colleagues at home. It hung in the balance 
whether we should not break f~pally at this juncture 
with this most difficult man. 4 
The Prime Minister expanded on his opinion a month later 
22Ibid., p. 246. 
23w111is, The French in Germany, p. 4. 
24churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 801. 
19 
(June 23, 1943), this time in a message to Marshal Stalin. 
I am concerned to hear through Monsieur Molotov that 
you are thinking of recognising the French National 
Committee of Liberation recently set up at Algiers . It 
is unlikely that the British , and still more that the 
United States Government , will recognise this Committee 
for some time and then only after they have had reason-
able proof that its character and action will be satis-
factory to the interests of the Allied cause. 
Headquaters cannot be sure of what he !Q-eneral 
de Gaull~will do or if his friendly feelings towards 
us if he obtained the mastery of the French Army •••• 
General Eisenhower has ••• in the name of both the 
United States and the British Governments notified the 
Connnittee that General Giraud must remain the Commander-
in-Chief of the French Army and have effective power 
over its character and organization •••• 
We are very anxious to find a French authority to 
which all Frenchmen will rally, and we still hope that 
one may emerge from the discussions now proceeding at 
Algiers. It seem§ to us far too soon to decide upon 
this at present.2~ 
Thus, even though Churchill favored de Gaulle above Vichy, 
it seems clear that he did not trust the Free French leader. 
The discussions referred to in Churchill's note to 
Stalin were those from which emerged the French CoIT1D'rl.ttee 
of National Liberation. Churchill welcomed the Committee, 
but he reserved the right to question the degree of 
recognition of this body as representative of France. 26 
While the British Government tended more toward the 
25Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the u.s.s.R., 
Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the u.s.s . R. and the Presidents of the~-~•!• 
and the PrimeMinisters-ofcfre~Britain during the Great 
Patriotic War of 19 1-1945'", (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 19 ?},Vol . I, PP• 135-136 . Hereinafter 
cited as Stalin•~ Correspondence . 
26Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, P• 138. 
20 
recognit i on of the Connnittee 1 s claims , they refused to 
chance the alienation of the Ameri can Government by openly 
opposing the position taken by that government, nor were 
t hey going to commit themselves without reservation to the 
newly formed Committee . 
The Soviet views resembled those of the British. 
During the early phase of the war the Soviet Government had 
little to do with decision- making in the Western theatres . 
This was not to say , however , that they were not interested 
in activities there . In general , the Soviets were somewhat 
skeptical of the American policy concerning France . In the 
first days after the acceptance of Darlan as the French 
leader in North Africa , V. M. Molotov , Soviet Foreign 
Secretary , informed the American and British Ambassadors in 
Moscow that he had qualms about what was going on in North 
Africa , and that he and his colleagues were confu~ed over 
the rapport with Darlan . The American and British Govern-
ments tried to allay the qualms by expressing in terms of 
military necessity their use of men who had served Vichy 
and app eared willing to serve Hitler . 2 7 This explanation 
seemingly satisfied the Soviets, but Molotov chose to 
remind the Western allies that the Soviets also were 
i nterested in French Africa and that he hoped no adminis-
t ration would be established there without advance 
27I bid., p . 91 . 
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consultation. 28 Stalin later added his personal approval 
of the American approach to the North African situation in 
separate notes to the Prime Minister and the President. To 
Churchill, on November 27, 1942, he wrote 
As for Darlan, I think the Americans have made skill-
ful use of him to facilitate the occupation of North 
and West Africa . Military diplomacy should know how 
to use for the war aims not on~y the Darlans , but even 
the devil and his grandmother .~ 
His message to Roosevelt , December 14, 1942, expressed the 
belief that the American policy toward Darlan was 
"absolutely sound" and continued to say that he considered 
"it an important achievement that you have succeeded in 
winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against 
Hitler. 11 30 This Soviet acquiesence to American support for 
a former pro-fascist should not be considered as a 
trivality, for the Soviets engaged in a death-struggle 
with Germany , opposed any collaboration with the ~azis.31 
Stalin 's attitude toward the French Committee of 
National Liberation was similar to that of the British. 
He, too, tended more toward supporting the claims of that 
body. His reply to Churchill's note of June 23, 1943 
28Ibid., p. 92. 
29stalin's Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 80. 
JOibid., Vol. II, p. 44. 
31British and Soviet dependence on American Lend-
Lease shipments, in the early stages of the war, were 
certainly a factor in the acceptance by the two nations 
of the American policy. 
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(asking that the Soviets withhold recognition of the 
Committee for a time), expressed surprise at the British 
attitude. "We had the impression," observed Stalin, "that 
the British Government had thus far supported General de 
Gaulle •••• "32 He agreed, however, to meet the British 
half way since the British had given assurance that no 
steps would be taken in the matter without consulting the 
Soviet Government. Then, following the pattern established 
by Molotov, he warned of Soviet interest in French affairs 
and reminded Churchill that information was necessary for 
appropriate decisions. 
Herbert Feis maintains that the Soviet attitude of 
the time resulted from the fact that both Stalin and de 
Gaulle, in the summer of 1943, were each trying to use the 
other to their own advantage. De Gaulle wanted the help 
of the French Communists in fighting the war and t n main-
taining order in France after the war. This he hoped to 
gain by wooing Stalin. Stalin, for his part, hoped to 
gain influence for the French Communists.33 
For the next sixteen months, the exact status of 
the French Committee remained undecided. True, no other 
body competed for the status of representative government 
of France; but neither was this status accorded to the 
32stalin 1 s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 140. 
33Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 315. 
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Committee. The United States was the major stumbling block 
throughout this period, for the Soviets had already ex-
pressed a willingness to grant recognition and the British, 
regardless of their expressed reservations, would undoubt-
edly have been glad to take the step were it not for the 
opposition of the United States. In August, 1943, Stalin 
agreed with Churchill that the French Committee should be 
represented on the commission for negotiations with Italy.34 
He later clarified his position on this question in a 
message to President Roosevelt in which he expressed his 
conviction that French representation "should be restricted 
to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in 
which the three Governments establishing the Commission 
decide that France has a direct interest."35 He continued 
to say 
It was never my intention that the French Committee 
of National Liberation should function on the same 
plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and the United States or enter its deliberation 
on all subjects.36 
Finally, on October 21, 1944, Roosevelt notified 
Stalin that active consideration was being given to recog-
nizing the French Committee of National Liberation as the 
Provisional Government of France, since the consultative 
34stalin 1 s Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 152. 
35Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 100-101. 
36Ibid. 
assembly had been ma.de more representative and the estab-
lishment of a real French zone of the interior was 
anticipated.37 These were the two requirements which the 
United States Government had ma.de as prerequisite to 
recognition of the Cormnittee following the resignation 
from that body of General Giraud, an action which left 
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de Gaulle in complete and undisputed control. Stalin 
welcomed the decision to recognize the French Provisional 
Government and informed the President that the Soviet 
representative in Paris had been given proper instructions 
on the matter.38 
This exchange of notes took place on October 21 and 
22, 1944. The formal recognition of the French Committee 
of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of 
France was finally effected on October 23. Thus, after 
more than four years of indecision, the question ~r 
recognition, in regard to France, was finally settled. 
But the French question as a whole was far from solved, for 
de Gaulle then unleashed his chauvinistic ambitions to 
their fullest extent. 
37Ibid., pp. 165-166. The French zone of the in-
terior, a civilian area completely controlled by the French, 
when established included most of France; see Cordell Hull, 
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 194ET, Vol. II~ 1434. 
38 Stalin's Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 166. 
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De Gaulle was not satisfied with the position he 
had attained for France through recognition. He immedi-
ately notified the Allies that France claimed equal status 
in forming all decisions having to do with war settlements 
and postwar arrangements.39 His demands were for 
••• a share in the military operations in Germany, 
the right to be consulted on measures involving the 
future of Europe or of the French Empire and, above 
all, occupation of an
4
area of Germany by French 
forces after the war. 0 
All of these demands were made during the winter of 1944, 
when the exact status of the French Government in the 
postwar world had not yet been decided. 
One point of dissatisfaction was de Gaulle's posi -
tion of dependency upon British and American good will. In 
November of 1944, in an attempt to secure his relations 
with the Soviet Government,41 de Gaulle notified Stalin 
that he would like to visit him in Moscow. Arran~ements 
were made and de Gaulle arrived in Moscow on December 2. 
On that date, Stalin notified both Churchill and Roosevelt 
that he expected de Gaulle to raise two questions while 
in Moscow: (1) the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet pact of 
mutual aid similar to the Anglo-Soviet pact, and (2) a 
proposal for revising the eastern frontier of France and 
39:Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin , p. 471. 
40w111is, The French in Germany, pp. 7-8. 
41Fe1s, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin , p. 473. 
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shifting it to the left [Easfil bank of the Rhine.42 He 
asked the two Western leaders for their position on these 
matters. On the following day, Stalin notified his allies 
that the questions had been raised. 
The replies he received fairly well concurred with 
his own views. On the question of a mutual aid pact, 
Churchill (December 5, 1944) expressed approval for a 
pact with France, and even suggested expanding the Anglo-
Soviet pact to include France.43 De Gaulie, however, 
proved unresponsive to the suggested tripartite pact.44 
Roosevelt's reply (December 7) not only consented to the 
proposed pact, but even suggested that such a matter 
primarily concerned the European powers involved. 45 On 
the question of the eastern frontier of France, both 
Churchill and Roosevelt expressed a desire to postpone 
a decision pending further discussion by the Big Three. 
Churchill went beyond Roosevelt in expressing a desire 
to have the French present when this question was discussed. 
De Gaulle now began to clamor for admittance to 
the oncoming conferences which would take place among the 
major powers. Here again the attitudes of the Big Three 
42stalin 1 s Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 277-278. 
43rbid., p. 281. 
44Ibid., p. 284. 
45rbid., Vol. II, p. 172. 
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toward France diverged. Churchill favored the inclusion of 
France at Yalta. Stalin, while not expressing enthusiasm, 
did not openly oppose such a step. Roosevelt, again, 
became the obstacle to French desires.46 With the many 
other issues demanding attention, no pressure was put on 
the President to include France. Roosevelt expressed his 
opinion to Churchill in a message of November 18, 1944, 
which stated, nrt does not seem to me that the French 
Provisional Government should take part in our next con1"'er-
ence as such a debating society would confuse our essential 
issues.«47 
De Gaulle was not long in reacting to this exclusion. 
On January 16, 1945 , he notified the three major powers 
that 
••• it must be observed that the conferences held 
between the other great allied powers lead those t o 
decide in advance, without the participation ~r France, 
the settlement of certain questions of a poli t ical or 
economic character which, however, interest France 
directly or indirectly, in which case the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic evidently could not 
consider itself bound by any of the decisions taken 
without it and, 4gonsequently, such decisions lose some of their value. 
This clearly comprised a warning that no decisions must be 
46Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 477. 
47Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States Di lomatic Papers: the Con1"'erences at Malta 
and Yalta, 9 as ngton: Goverruiient Printing 01Tice, 
IB5J, p. 1. ereinafter cited as Yalta Papers. 
48rbid., p. 296. 
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made for France without representatives of that nation 
being present to inform the allies of the French views and 
to aid in making the decisions. The warning was, however, 
ignored. 
Two important decisions were made at Yalta which 
affected the French directly: the French were given a 
zone of occupation in defeated Germany, and they were 
accorded representation on the Control Council which was 
to direct the occupation of Germany.49 The question of 
a French zone of occupation created no overriding problem, 
although both Roosevelt and Stalin expressed the opinion 
that such an allocation was an act of kindness. On the 
question of French participation on the Control Council, 
however, debate was long and difficult. 
Churchill carried the burden of championing French 
aspirations for representation on the Control Council. 
He used a three-pronged approach that (1) Great Britain 
needed a strong France for the purpose of helping to guard 
the left flank of England from possible future German 
attacks, (2) the United Stat es would not be able to main-
tain an occupation force in Germany for any length of time 
and that Britain therefore needed France in the western 
49For the full text of this discussion see the Yalta 
Paters, pp. 299-JOO, 301, 303, 307, 309, 425, 440, 616-619, 
63, 701-702, 704-707, 709, 710, 718-719, 729, 899-900, 
908, 913, 927, 930, 933, 936-937, 948, 951, 961, 970-971, 
978. 
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zone of occupation, and (3) France would not accept a zone 
of occupation unless she was also granted a seat on the 
control machinery.50 
Stalin readily accepted the burden of opposition. 
He countered Churchill's reasoning with the arguments that 
(l) to allow France to participate in the control machinery 
of defeated Germany would be opening the door to similar 
requests from other nations, (2) the control machinery 
should be limited to those powers who had stood firm 
against Germany and had made the greatest sacrifices to 
bring about an allied victory, and (3) France did not fit 
into this category while other nations did.51 He suggested 
that the British could represent the French on the Control 
Council. 
Roosevelt at first took the position held by Stalin, 
that France should not participate in the control '"lB.Chinery. 
He later did an about-face, however, and aligned his views 
with those of Churchill. Roosevelt allegedly decided it 
would be easier to obtain de Gaulle's agreement to other 
decisions if France were allowed to participate in the 
control machinery.52 
Various interpretations have been given to the 
5orb1d., pp. 616-617. 
5lrb1d., pp. 617-618. 
52rbid., pp. 899-900. 
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Soviet attitude toward French participation in the occupa-
tion of Germany. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy , 
noted in his Diaries an observation made by Secretary of 
State Edward Reilly Stettinius , Jr., at Yalta , the essence 
of which was that the Russians were not particularly 
interested in having the French occupy a part of Germany 
and expressed a general lack of interest in de Gaulle . 53 
John L. Snell maintains that Stalin's main opposition, 
at Yalta, to a zone of occupation for France in defeated 
Germany arose from the accompanying arguments for inclusion 
of France in the control machinery.54 While this interpre-
tation has its merits, perhaps Snell misplaced emphasis on 
the question. The Soviets probably had little opposition 
to a zone of occupation for France in Germany , but the 
opposition was to placing France on the control machinery 
which would direct the occupation. The proposed French 
zone, after all, would be taken from the American and 
British zones and would therefore have little effect on 
the Soviet zone. But to place the French in a position 
where they would have a voice in governing occupied Germany 
would quite forseeably affect the Soviets . This 
53walter Millis and E. s . Duffield (eds.), The 
Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press , 195I°J,'" 
p. 35. 
54John L. Snell, Wartime Origins of the East-West 
Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: The Hauser;-Press,7:95"9), 
p. 1.59. --
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interpretation gains support from Stalin's concession of a 
zone of occupation to France early in the Yalta Conference, 
while that conference was nearly over before he conceded 
to allow the French a position on the control machinery. 
The Soviet attitude was probably best stated in the follow-
ing remark by Stalin to Roosevelt at Yalta: "It was 
unrealistic ••• for de Gaulle to insist upon full rights 
with the Big Three, in view of the fact that France had 
not done nruch fighting in the war. 11 55 
Consequently, the period of the Potsdam Conference 
was approached with the position of France defined in an 
ambiguous manner. While she had been returned to her 
position among the members of the community of nations, 
she had not been recognized as an equal by the other major 
powers. Even Churchill, at Yalta , did not suggest that 
France participate in future meetings of the Big Tb~ee. 
Sbe was not all owed representation at Yalta , yet both the 
American and British Governments felt that she should be 
consulted on matters which concerned her.56 The Soviets 
55Edward Reilly Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the 
Russians: the Yalta Conference, Edited by Walter Johnson 
(Garden City;-N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949), 
p. 100. 
56For the American viewpoint, see the Yalta Papers , 
p. 945. The views of Churchill were expressed by 
Stettinius in Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 123. 
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would undoubtedly have been happy had France achieved only 
the status of a satellite of Britain and the United States. 
While not recognized as an equal, France was given 
equal power with the other three powers in the occupation 
of Germany. Unfortunately, similar treatment of France 
continued. 
CHAPTER III 
PARTIES AT POTSDAM AND THE FRENCH REACTION 
Two peculiarities concerning representation were 
noticeable as the various delegations assembled at Pots -
dam for this last historic war conference. The first was 
that a Polish delegation attended. 1 Under existing 
circumstances this mi gh t not be regarded as too strange, 
for the Polish question was one of the most important 
issues with which the conferees were faced. Peculiarity 
appears, however, when one considers that the French were 
not accorded representation at the conference. Thus, 
Poland was given representation while France, an allied 
power and a partner in the future occupation and control 
of Germany, was not. 
Why were the French not included at Potsdam? The 
answer may have lain in the attitude of the great powers 
toward France . As shown in the preceeding chapter, the 
French had not been accepted as an equal by the three 
great powers even at the conclusion of the Yalta Conference . 
1Department of State , Foreign Relations of the United 
States Diplomatic Papers: the Conference of Berlintthe 
Potsdam Conference), 00, [Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1960, Vol. II, p . XLVII. Hereinafter cited as 
Potsdam Papers. 
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Michael Balfour maintains that 
It was inevitable that the other three Great Powers 
should fail to treat France on a footing of complete 
equality. Conditions since the liberation had made it 
impossible to replace the French Provisional Govern-
ment by one elected on an agreed constitutional basis. 
Communications had suffered badly •••• Memoires of the 
occupation and of the Vichy2regime made deep scars in the national consciousness. 
The unity found in opposing the Germans, upon which so much 
hope for the future was based, gradually degenerated to 
internal factional quarrels. Also, the French were greatly 
dependent upon outside aid.3 
While lmowledge of the French attitude regarding 
their status does little or nothing to answer the question 
of the exclusion of France from the conference, it does 
extend that question. De Gaulle was determined to be 
admitted to this conference. Balfour found that 
The chief concern of the French was to get them-
selves recognized as a Great Power, and to do this 
they had to share in the occupation on equal terms • 
••• so obsessed were the French with the change in 
their status that they devoted much of their energy 
to an attempt to per~uade other countries that 
nothing had changed.4 
2Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control 
in Germany and Austria, ~-14i6, Vol. VI of Survey of International Affairs, 1939-19 , edited by Arnold Toynbee 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 37. Herein-
after cited as Balfour and Mair, Four-Power Control in 




Wi th fina l de c is i ons pending regarding the policy to be 
fo llowed in at least the initial stages of the occupation 
of Germany , de Gaulle felt it essential that the French 
views be formally expressed and discussed . Of special 
interest to the French was the boundary question . Previous 
attempts to reach a decision with the three great powers on 
this question(~• &•, de Gaulle ' s visit to Moscow in 
December, 1941+) met with failure . The great desire of the 
French was that the eastern frontier of France be extended 
to the Rhine . The French were excluded , however , and the 
French views were largely ignored . 
Available evidence suggests that neither Churchill 
nor Truman wished to have the French , and de Gaulle in 
particular , present at the conference . Both the Memoirs 
of Truman.5 and the writings of Churchi116 devote space to 
the difficulti e s of dealing with the French durin~ the in-
vasion period . On more than one occasion the French 
deviated seriously from the invasion plan of February , 
194.5 , and refused to y i eld their position until pressure 
.5Harry s . Truman , Year of Decisions , Vol . I of 
Memoirs by Harry s. TrumanTGarden City , N. Y.: Doubleday 
and Company , Inc., 1955) , pp . 238- 243 . 
6winston s . Churchill , Triumph and Tragedy , Vol. VI 
of The Second World War (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company , 
19~ pp . 561-568 . -
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(~.&,.., threats to suspend aid and material) was applied.7 
As a result of this activity both Washington and London be-
came convinced that de Gaulle's presence at the conference 
would hinder rather than help, even if Stalin could be 
persuaded to include him. The conviction was that it would 
make the task harder and confuse, if not destroy, the pro-
gress of discussion. 8 
De Gaulle , doubtlessly, believed that his obstructive 
activities would show the Allies that he must be consulted 
on important decisions. Unfortunately , the result was the 
opposite. Thus , relates Willis , "France was to remain in 
official relegation until the end of the Potsdam Conference , 
in spite of the fact that France was then in possession of 
a zone of occupation in Germany. 119 France did not, there-
f~re, become a party to the Potsdam Conference nor a 
signatory to the agreements which resulted. 
7willis maintains that this furor resulted from 
French dissatisfaction with their part in the invasion of 
Germany as provided by the invasion plan of February 1945. 
They felt they should have been assigned a more active part 
in the invasion. See F. Roy Willis , The French in Germany , 
1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, '!962), p . 
Hereinafter cited as Willis , The French in Germany . 
8Herbert Feis, Between Peace and iJar: the Potsdam 
Conference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press , 
1960), p. 138. Hereinafter cited as Feis , Between Peace 
and War . 
9willis, The French in Germany, p. 22. 
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Can the logic of the great powers be substantiated 
in this case? Apparently the decision to exclude France 
from the Potsdam Conference was based on errone ous judg e-
ment . The French , and de Gaulle in particular , had shown on 
several occasions that they would not adhere to decisions ad-
versely affecting their national interests unless they helped 
formulate those decision s . 10 Yet, the French were ref used 
the desired opportunity to express their views at Potsdam. 
Willis maintained that the resu lts of excluding 
France from the Potsdam Conference might have been ex-
pected by the three great powers, for "France considered 
itself bound only b y t hose Allied decisions on which it 
had been consulted; the others it felt free to accept or 
reject according to its own best interests . 1111 In this 
contention , he is supported by other notable writers in 
the field . Feis expressed his view on this suh ject as 
follows: 
If de Gaulle had been at Potsdam the trudg e toward 
the word-wrapped accords reache d there would have been 
even more wearing than it was . There is little or no 
reason for thinking t hat they wou ld have lasted longer . 
What the interplay of personal relations between de 
Gaulle and the other three would have been bests the 
lOExarnples of French activity of this natu re have 
already been mentioned in this paper: ~•&• , the Free 
French seizure of t he islands of St . Pierre and .Miquelon 
in 1941, and the French obstructionist activity during the 
period of the invasion of Germany . 
llw1111s , The French in Germany , p . 22 . 
imagination. All that can be said is that since the 
French government [sic :J was not obligated by the Pots-
dam accords, it felt freer to combat their application 
in an effort to bend them to its purposes .lL 
Balfour, writing of the visit of de Gaulle and French 
Foreign Secretary Georges Bidault with President Truman 
in Washington shortly after the Potsdam Conference, 
reported that 
The French leaders made it clear that not having 
been invited to Potsdam , they did not consider them-
selves bound by the agreements there reached. In 
particular, they deplored any suggestion of re-
establishing a centralized German state, asked for 
a French-administered Rhineland to be separated from 
Germany, proposed the creation of an international 
authority to control the Ruhr, and sought permission 
to annex the Saar. They were afraid that the loss of 
Germany's eastern provinces might throw her centre of 
gravity towards the west and that a Russ£31erman alli -ance might bring Communism to the Rhine . 
If the Potsdam conferees did not understand the depth 
of the French feeling at their exclusion from the conference, 
the French reaction to the decisions made there should have 
given them clearer insight. The Potsdam Papers contain 
twenty-three pages of notes and conversations expressing the 
French reaction.14 
12Feis, Between Peace and War , p. 313. 
13Balfour and Mair , Four-Power Control in Germany 
and Austria, p. 123. 
14For the full text of French reservations see the 
Potsdam Papers, Vol. II, pp. 1543-1566. 
An early report observed that nwhile the general 
reaction appears to have been favorable it would be idle 
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to deny that the French nonetheless have some reservations 
about the results of' the Potsdam Conference. 11 15 This 
report was sent by the American representative in Paris at 
2 P.M. on August 7, 1945. Ten hours later, French Foreign 
Minister Bidault transmitted the French position to the 
State Department via the American representative in Paris. 
It became clear indeed that the French had some reservations 
concerning the Potsdam decisions. 
The French Government raised no objections to the 
principle of the transfer to Germany of German minority 
populations which were still in Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Noting the difficulties that could arise, f'rom a 
sudden increase in population in the different zones, how-
ever, the French Government expressed unwilling"'.ess to take 
a definite fixed position on this complex problem until 
more detailed information could be received. 16 
No objection was raised, by the French , to the ex-
tension of the Polish western boundary. The belief was 
expressed, however, that 11 the problem of the frontiers of 
15Ibid., p. 1549. 
16Ibid., P• 1551. 
Germany forms a whole and is not susceptible of solution 
until it has been examined jointly by all interested 
powers." 17 
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The French Government accepted with pleasure the 
invitation to participate in the Allied Reparations 
Conmrl.ssion. At the same time, however, it reserved the 
right to make known at a later date the French Govern-
ment's view on economic principles which should govern the 
control of Germany, especially the contemplated basis for 
settling the reparations question. 1 8 
The French gladly accepted an invitation to par-
ticipate in a council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs . 
This opportunity was chosen to remi nd the great powers 
that France was obviously interested in all important 
questions concerning Europe or any region of Europe and to 
express the conviction that the French Government could not 
accept~ priori the reconstitution of a central government 
in Germany. 19 
Regarding political principles, the French Govern-
ment regretfully viewed the principles designed to govern 
Germany with reservations until full information on the 
l7Ibid., p. 1552. 
18Ibid., p. 1552-1553. 
19rbid., pp. 1553-1554. 
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su b j ect cou l d be more thoroughl y observed . Two principles 
were mentioned in particular : the principle concerning 
political parties for the whole of Germany and the one 
concerning the c reation of central administrative depart -
20 ments . 
Willis maintains that the major economic principle 
to whi ch the French objected was Claus e 14, which stated: 
During the period of occupa tion , Germany shall be 
treated as a s i n gle economic unit . To this end common 
p olicies shall be e stablished in reg ard to (a) mining 
a nd industrial production and allocat ion; (b) a gricul-
ture , forestry and fishing ; ( c ) wages , prices and 
rationing; (d) import and export programs for Germany 
as a whole ; ( e ) curren c y and banking , central taxation 
a n d customs ; (f) reparation and r emoval of war 
potential; (g) transportation and conrrnunication . 21 
He further relatec that the French especially opposed 
Clause 15 (c) , wh ich agreed upon "equitable distribution 
of ess ential commodities be tween the different zones so as 
to produce a balan c e d economy throughout Germany and reduce 
the need f or imports . 1122 
Later the French added more complaints a b ou t the 
treatment they were receiving . Wh i le de Gaulle and Bidault 
were in Washi ngton following the Potsd am Conference , 
Bidault met and conversed [}.ugust 23 , 194§ with Secretary 
20ibid. , pp . 1554-1555. 
21Willis , The French in Germany, p . 26 . 
22I b i d. 
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of State Byrnes . Bidault referred to the fact of repara-
tions being decided (at Yalta and Potsdam) without allowing 
France to present any arguement as 11 a cruel fate, just as 
detrimental to the harmony between the Allies and the 
equitable settlement of currnet questions as to France 
herself. 1123 He related that France had hoped to have 
German coal, which was desperately needed by the French, 
placed on the reparation list, but that in view of the coal 
settlement France was now faced with the problem of having 
to pay for German coal in dollars . In speaking of the 
settlement of the Polish western boundary Bidault noted 
that the German center of gravit y would be moved westward. 
He suggested that should this westward shift continue France 
might be obliged to adopt attitudes necessary for her 
security, since historically a westward shifting of the 
German center of gravity had been bad for France. 
On September 4, 1945, the French noted the con-
stitution of a naval commission by delegates of the 
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to 
distribute German warships and merchant ships. They 
complained that this action was contrary to the approved 
agreement of the European Advisory Commission to sett le 
all such questions on a quadripartite basis, and insisted 
23Potsdam P 8pers, Vol. II, pp. 1558-1559. For the 
full text of the discussion see pp. 1557-1564. 
that the French be included and that no distribution be 
affected until this was done.24 
By the middle of September, 1945, then, the three 
great powers had been well informed to the effect that 
the French were not in complete agreement with the Pots-
dam decisions. In fact, they were in disagreement with 
several major aspects of the design for the occupation 
and control of defeated Germany. Willis maintains that 
the "French rejection of these aspects of the Allied 
solution to the German problem was due to a basic diver-
gence of opinion about the measures to be applied to 
25 Germany." This contention is without a doubt valid. 
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The French had repeatedly stated their views how Germany 
should be treated since 194L~. When Harry Hopkins was in 
Paris, he and the American Ambassador in France (Jefferson 
Caffery) met with Frence Foreign Secretary Bidau1 t 
(January 30, 1945) from which the French position on post-
war control of Germany was summarized as: 
Elimination of all war i ndustry and near-war 
industry in Germany, an international body to be set 
up to govern and control the Rhine region, the southern 
part thereof to be controlled exclusively by the French, 
the northern part under mixed control; Germany to be 
reduced to a status2~aking it impossible for her to wage war again •••• 11 
24rbid., pp. 1565-1566. 
25Willis, The French in Germany, p. 26. 
26 Yalta Papers, pp. 299-300. 
This view, which in some aspects resembled the Morganthau 
proposal wh ich would have reduced Germany to a pastoral 
state, was at variance with the Allied desire to create a 
centralized government in Germany at the earli e st feasible 
opportunity. The French had not, however, been accorded an 
opportunity to present their views at Potsdam where such 
differences could have b een dispelled. 
While Willis points out that there was a dif ference 
in views, he fails to note the reason for the difference. 
The French had become highly concerned regarding their 
security. Three times, since 1870, French and German 
armies had met on the field of battle. On two of those 
occasions the French had be en soundly def eated, and on the 
other (World War I) they had suffered severe losses and 
hardship. The French were determined that Germany should 
never again become a threat to their security, and one of 
the simplest methods of assuring this was to make certain 
that Germany would never again become a strong , centralized 
nation with war-making potential. 
Still another aspect of the problem was that of 
French national honor. Attention has been g iven earlier in 
t his study to the chauvinism of de Gaulle and to the French 
desire to persuade other nations that the status of France 
in the community of nations had not changed from that of 
pre-World War II. With this motivating desire in the back-
ground, the student wonders if the French would have been 
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s atisfied t o pre sen t their vi ews for discussion and then 
been willing to c ompromise , or would they have demanded 
that the essential principles of their views be accepted . 
I f the French were willing to compromise , then their ex-
clusion from Potsdam was a gr ave error in vi ew of their 
later obstructive activities . If , however , the French 
were unwilling to compromise , then to include them at Pots-
dam would certainly have been a trying and wasteful 
experience . This is mere speculation , at best , which can 
never be answered with certainty. 
General Lucius D. Cl ay , an American military leader 
in Germany , expressed the opinion that even though the 
French were not in full agreement with the Potsdam Agree-
ments, such diff erences could be worked out in future 
meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers . 27 Un-
fortunately , this attitude seemed to dominate not only 
American , but Allied thinking . 
French obstruction began in the Allied Control 
Council . The Council was the most ef f ective place to 
practice such activity sinc e decisions reached by that 
body had to be unanimous to go i nto effect. Disagree-
ment by any member , therefore , constituted an eff ec t ive 
veto to enforce their demands . 
27Luc i u s D. Clay , German~ and the b j ght for Fr eedom 
(Cambridge : Harvard Uni versityress, --r9°5 , p .-m. 
At the end of October, 1945, General Louis-Marie 
Koeltz, the French repre sentative on the Control Council, 
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eclared that on instructions from his government he could 
not accept the concrete proposals, reached by the Council, 
to create five central German administrative departments in 
accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. 28 
In the ensuing period, France used her veto power in 
the Council to block every action which might lead to the 
re-establishment of a German nation through the treatment 
of Germany as an economic or political entity. She refused 
to p ermit free interzonal trade and economic unification, 
she obstructed the formation of political parties on a 
national basis, she refused permission for interzonal 
org anization of trade uni ons, she vetoed a proposal to per-
mit the issue of uniform postage stamps in the four zones, 
end she vetoed a proposal to permit uniform currency in the 
four zones.29 By this obstruction the French hoped to ob-
tain certain security demands which they considered indis-
pensible. 
Warburg observed that although the British and 
American authorities became exasperated with the ob-
28Balfour and Mair, Four-Power Control in Germany 
and Austria, p. 124. --
29James Paul Warburg, Germany: K.5y to Peace 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 3)-;-p. 17. 
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s tructionist t actics of the Fr ench , they made no effort to 
deal with the very real problem of French security. JO It 
was this activity which convinced Warburg that giving 
France such a degree of power as a zone of occupation , a 
seat on the Al lied Control Council , and veto power over any 
Council decision without making her a party to the agree-
ment which governed the quadripartite government of Germany 
constituted a serious blunder . 31 
JOibid . 
31Ibid., p . 21 . 
CHAPTER IV 
EFFECTS OF FRENCH OBSTRUC ITONISM 
Despite French tactics the British and United States 
Governments continued to support France. 'lbe position of 
the United States may be clarified by the following report 
handed to President Trurn...an by officials of the Department 
of State on April 13, 1945: 
'Ihe best interest of the United States require 
that every effort be made by this Government to 
assist France, morally as well as physically, to 
regain her strength and her influence •••• positive 
American contributions toward the rebuilding of France 
include: present and future rearming of the French 
Army; support of French participation in the European 
Advisory Commission, the control and occupation of 
Germany, the Reparations Commission and other organ-
izations; and the conclusion of a Lend-Lease 
Agreement.l 
Hence, the American Government felt it necessary to 
continue to support France in order to help that nation 
regain its position among the nations of the world. 
At Yalta Churchill expressed the British need for 
a strong French ally on the continent of Europe; 2 that 
Britain was in a position where friendly relations with 
France were necessary. Yet, Churchill did not like 
1Harry s. Truman, Year of Decisions, Vol. I of 
Memoirs by Harry s. TrumanTGarc!en City, N.Y.: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1955), PP• 14-15. 
2see page 28 of this study. 
de Gaulle and considered him one of the greatest dangers 
to European peace . 3 He felt, however, that the task of 
reaching an agreement with de Gaulle, although difficult, 
must be continued. 
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Consequently, both the British and American Govern-
ments continued to support France in keeping with their 
respective national interests. Possibly they tried to 
make a distinction between de Gaulle and the French nation, 
anticipating a national election in France that would 
remove de Gaulle from office and replace him with a more 
compliant mau. Such thoughts, if they were entertained 
by the British and Am.erican leaders, soon were proven to 
be highly optimistic, for French obstruction continued 
after de Gaulle resigned and Fe'lix Gouin formed a new 
government. 
'Ihe Soviet attitude toward France apparently had 
not changed from that of the war years. The Sovie ts 
refused to accept France as a great and equal power. This 
attitude was probably most aptly expressed by the contro-
versy which arose over a decision made in the Council of 
Foreign Ministers on September 11, 1945. On that date the 
Council agreed that: 
••• all five members [9hina, Great Britain, France, 
the Soviet Union, and the United State:V should have 
t h e right to attend all meetings and take part in all 
3'Iruman, Year of Decisions, p. 242. 
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discussions but that in matters concerning peace 
settlements members whose governments had not been 
signatories to the relev~nt terms of surrender should 
not be entitled to vote.4 
Molotov, the Soviet representative on the Councll, then 
changed the Soviet position and expressed the interpreta-
tion that for peace treaties only ministers of the Soviet 
Union, Great Brita n, and the United States should meet in 
discussion. 'Il~is interpretation was based on the expressed 
belief that only signatories to the armistices should 
discuss the treaties.5 Prime Minister Attlee, in a message 
to Stalin,6 expressed the British interpretation that 
the Council of Foreign Ministers as a whole was responsible 
for discharging all tasks remitted to it and further pointed 
out that even if the Soviet approach would accelerate the 
work of the Council, as Molotov contended, it would not 
counterbalance the damage to harmonious collaboratio~. 
President Truman had sent a message to Stalin thb previous 
day urging the Soviets to consider the bad effect it would 
have on world peace if Molotov should permit the Council 
4Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the u.s.s.R., 
Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the U.S.S."R:-and the Presiaents of theU.S.A. 
and the Prime7rrnisters-of Grear-Britain during Tiie Tirea! 
and Patriotic War of ft94I=l~ol. I (Moscow: Foreign 
Lariguages Publishing ouse~57), p. 376. 
5Ibid. 
6Attlee to Stalin, September 23, 1945, Ibid. 
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to be destroyed.7 The Western protests were ineffectual, 
however, for Stalin upheld Molotov's stand on the issue.8 
Byrnes observed that revoking the Council decision 
of September 11, 1945, would have allowed French participa-
tion in discussions on both the Italian and German treaties, 
but would have limited it to these discussions only. 9 
Probably of more L~portance, however, was his charge that 
"the Soviet attitude in effect killed any hope of real 
progress at London. 1110 
The Soviets were, therefore, actually the first to 
obstruct the coordination of the Allies although the method 
of their obstruction had no direct effect on the control of 
Germany. This display of superiority toward France could 
only be accepted by the French as an affront to their 
position as an ally and to their national honor. Appar-
ently the Soviets once again desired to exclude France 
from ne gotiations which the French considered important 
to the future of their nation. No doubt t he French re-
membered this when they exerted their veto power in the 
7Truman to Stalin, September 22, 1945, ~•, Vol. 
II, P• 271 .. 
Bstalin to Truman, September 231 1945, Ibid., p. 273, and Stalin to Attlee, September 24, 1945, Ibid-:-;---v'ol. I, 
PP• 377-378. 
9Jarnes F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1958r,-p-.-3Ib. 
lOibid. 
Allied Control Council in October, 1945. 
On returning from the Paris Conference of Foreign 
Ministers (June 15-July 12, 1946) Secretary of State Byrnes 
reported that "it is no secret that the four-power control 
of Germany on a zonal basis is not working well from the 
point of view of any or the rour powers •. "11 He further 
reported that, at Paris, the French agreed to the estab-
lishment or central administrative agencies for purposes 
of treating Germany as an economic unit when the Saar was 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the agencies. The 
Soviets, however, could not agree without rurther study. 
'.Ihe immediate effects have been expressed in several 
sources. Former President Truman observed that "their 
[the Frencri} desire to see Germany dismembered led them to 
obstruct a number of joint-control measures at a time when 
such cooperation might still have been possiblP, ."12 
Warburg•s more detailed description related that the French 
tactics consequently divided Germany into ".four, separate, 
hermetically sealed compartments." 13 He elaborated on this 
1111 Report by Secretary of State By-.!'nes on Paris Con-
ference of Foreign Ministers, June 15-July 12, 1;}46," 'Ihe 
Denartment of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 369 ~uly 2-s-;-
1946}, P• 171. 
12Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II 
of Memoirs by Harry s. Truman (Garden City';-N.Y.: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1956), P• 121. 
13James Paul Warburg, German;y:: to Peace 
(Cam.bridge: Harvard University Press, 1 ), p. 22. 
Hereinafter cited as Warburg, Germany: Key to Peace. 
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conclusion with the explanation that: 
Once it became clear that French obstruction was 
going to continue and that neither Britain nor the 
United States seemed to know how to put a stop to it, 
the Russians drastically changed their original policy 
of insistence upon carrying out the Potsdam contract • 
••• they shifted to a policy of getting the maximum 
advantage for themselves out cf their zone of occupa-
tion. Instead of removing plant and equipment for 
reparations account, as agreed at Potsdam, they now 
switched to leaving plants in Germany and--contrary 
to the Potsdam Agreement-,taking out a large part of 
their current production.~ 
Warburg further related that the Soviet Union had also seized 
the political initiative when on July 10, 1946, Mr. Molotov 
"went on record as opposing any French annexations of 
German territory and proposed the early creation of an 
anti-fascist central German Government. 1115 By this move 
the Soviet Union became, in the eyes of the German people , 
"the champion of German unity and the defender of Gerillan 
soil against French annexation. 1116 
The Soviets also obtained an economic advantage 
which was quite lasting in nature. Warburg related that: 
Continuation of the zonal barriers meant that, 
while Russia was taking out millions of dollars at 
one end of Germany, and France was making a slight 
profit out of its zone, Britain and the United States 
were compelled to pour in their own money at the other 
end--••• some five hundred million dollars a year .17 
l4Ibid., p. 24. 
l5rbid. 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid., p. 22. 
54 
Willis has briefly described both the immediate and 
the long-range effect in the following analysis: 
French opposition had the important effect of 
paralyzing implementation of the Potsdam decisions 
by the Allied Control Council. 'lhis paralysis brought 
about the virtual autonomy of each zonal commander and 
made possible a great differentiation of policy in the 
different zones. It also changed the very nature of 
the German problem by ensuring that the future trial of 
strength between Russia and the Western powers would 
have as fgs battlefield a divided rather than a unified 
Germany. 
:Michael Bal.four relates that Marshal Vasili 
11 Solrnlovsky fJ:;he Russian connnander in Germani] would not 
believe that the Americans were not secretly encouraging 
the French; ••• that, were this not the case, the French 
would have been brought to heel by being denied the United 
States supplies on which they depended. 1119 This statement 
was indicative of the difference in systems represented by 
the occupying powers. Soviet centralization exte ed 
beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union proper and into 
all areas controlled by that nation. "The Russians, 
forming their opinions on the basis of their own treatment 
of satellites, could not understand why Britain and the 
18F .. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, l~i5-1949 
(Stanf'ord: Stanf'ord University Press, 1962}, P• • 
19Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control 
in Germany and Austria, ey§~5-24~6, Vol. Vfof Survey of Yiiterna.tiona'r°Affairs, _l __ -1 , edited by Arnold Toynbee 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), PP• 124-125. 
I-Iereina.fter cited as Balfour and Mair, Four-Power Control 
!g Germany and Austria. --
United States did not make France come to hee1 . n20 
Sokolovsky•s statement also indicated that the Russians 
considered France to be only a satellite to Britain a11d 
the United States. 
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Attempts to bring the French into line evidently 
developed from a ne gative approach. In December, 1945, 
Secretary of State Byrnes announced that the United States 
would proceed without France in centralization measures 
for Germany. 21 Eugene Davidson also reported this event, 
rel2.t ing that 11 •• • the Americans • •• threatened to establish 
three-power machinery in the Russian, British, and American 
zones if the French persisted in their obstruction. "22 But 
no record of such action was found. 
'Ille question was not , however, one of attempts being 
made to curb French obstructionism, rather it was one of 
when the attempts were made and of what type they were . 
Tbe above threats seemed only to have had the effect of 
heightening French fears concerning t heir security. This 
being the case , the result could only be the opposite of 
20warburg , Germany: K~ to Peace, p. 22 . 
21Balfou.r and Mair , Four-Power Control in Germa~ 
and Austria, p . 124; citing- Basil Davidson, Germany:at 
Now? (London: Frederick Muller , 1950) , P• 70 . 
22Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germani : an 
Account of the American OcciipaITon-(New 1orlc:Alfred A. 
Knopf, i~J'6l1,p. 82 . Hereinafter cited as Davidson, Th~ 
Dea.th and Life of Germany . 
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that desired. Apparently the time when France could have 
been controlled by threats had passed, and that the time 
had arrived when compromise was the key-word of cooperation. 
However , no evidence has been found to support a statement 
that a valid attempt at compromise was made, and the French 
rears persisted . 
Warburg also questioned the Western approach to the 
issue of French security. Writing of this probler.1 at a 
later date he observed that: 
The outstanding fact about the four-power experiment, 
as the writer saw it in August , 1946, was that t he 
initiative as to Germany's future had been left to 
France and Russia during the entire f1.rst year of 
occupation. The French lmew what they did not want, 
and obstructed it. Arter six months of this, the 
Russians lmew what they wanted, and proceeded to take 
it. Neither Britain nor the United States had a po~icy 
to supplant the broken-down quadripartite contra.ct. 3 
He became more specific with his charge when he stated that 
"indeed, the real fault lay in the failure of t he British 
and American Governments to develop a common policy with 
the French."24 
General Lucius Clay related that in the early 
occupation the Soviets, although showing a distrust for 
France and Great Britain, evidenced a true desire to reach 
23warburg, Germany: Ke,,,.l to Peace, p . 23. 
24Ibid., P• 31. 
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agreement with the United States. 25 By the spring of 1948, 
however, this desire had been elirnina ted from the Soviet 
policy. In the early part of 1948 (January-June) the 
United States, Britain, and France met in London with 
other nations of Western Europe on two different occasions. 
These conferences resulted in agreements for the close 
cooperation of Western Germany with the rest of Europe. 26 
On March 20, 1948, after the first London meeting, Marshal 
Sokolovsky appeared at a meeting of the Allied Control 
Council long enough to read a paper declaring that "by 
meeting in London without Russia the three powers had acted 
illegally and the quadripartite government of Berlin was 
consequently at an end."27 The Soviet reasoning was that 
Berlin was in the Russian zone and the quadripartite govern-
ment there depended upon successful quadripartite action in 
all of Germany. 28 
'.Ihe long-range effects of French obstruction, then, 
might be described as playing a large part in turning 
Germany into a political battleground on which the powers 
of the world are at present engaged in a "Cold War" 
25Lucius D. Cl ay, Germany~ the Fight for Freedom 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,~50), p.--r7. 
26Davidson, The Death and Life 2£_ Germany, P• 187. 
27~., P• 188. 
28Ibid., p. 189 . 
composed of ideological conflict and the age old struggle 
of power politics. Charges leveled against the West, even 
by Western writers, were increasingly brought against all 
three Western powers, and particularly against the United 
States and Britain. Eugene v. Rostow proviaed a classical 
example of this in an article in~ New York Times Maga-
zine (June 6, 1948) in which he accused the United States 
and Great Britain of following a policy based largely on 
"blind irritability with the French."29 He suggested that 
hindsight had proven the French policy to be correct in the 
period following World War I and that it might well be 
again correct. 
For those who would maintain that French obstruc-
tionism was temporary in nature, however, brief attention 
must be given to more recent activity by that nation. 
When the question of rearming Germany by the creat ion of 
the European Defense Community arose in the early 1950's, 
the French again turned to obstruction. They maintained 
that "the future of the Saar must be settled before they 
would approve the arming of German contingents,n30 despite 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' "expressed doubt 
29Eugene v. Rostow, "Germany: a Warning," The New 
York Times Magazine (June 6, 1948), P• 9+. 
30Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany, p. 348. 
59 
that the two questions could be tied together."3l Even 
though influential voices in France, the United States, 
and England warned that continued French obstruction 
could lead to the Germans being armed without French 
consent, the French Government refused to bring the issue 
before the National Assembly.32 Dulles applied threats of 
reappraisals in American policy even while compromising on 
some of the French demands, specifically the Saar question. 
Under pressure, the French Government finally took the 
question of the European Defense Community before the 
National Assembly on August 30, 1954, where it met 
defeat.33 In the uproar that followed, Germany was re-
armed without French consent, largely by way of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.34 
By 1954, Great Britain and the United States had 
evidently decided that France would not be allowed to 
check the whole of Western policy by her obstructive 
activity. Significant damage, however, had already been 
accomplished. Western unity, which might have accomplished 
much, was missing , and it has not really been attained 
even today. 
3lrbid. 
32rbid., pp. 348-349. 




The ideological concepts held by the occupying 
powers were as diverse in nature as were some of the 
national interests represented. Many opportunities for 
conflict among the powers were present. From this it 
might be assumed that the French problem lacked signifi-
cance relative to the breakdown of the Potsdam agreements 
on the grounds that the breakdown would have evolved even 
without French obstructio. 
Yet, one must consider such aspects as General 
Clay's observation that the Soviets evidenced a desire 
to reach agreement with the United States during the 
initial phase of the occupation. Harry Trwr1an' s analysis 
of French obstructionism, in effect, admitted that the 
French activity had closed the door on the chances of 
reconcilliation while such chances still existed. Finally, 
the Soviets made no real effort to destroy the Potsdam 
accords until the summer of 1946, months after the French 
obstruction began. These considerations suggest that 
reconcilliation was possible, but that French obstruction-
ism proved an insurmountable obstacle which destroyed 
whatever accord remained among the powers and thus played 
a large part in the division of Germany into two camps: 
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East Germany, dominated by the Soviets; and West Germany, 
aligned with the Western powers. The Germany of today is 
a major pawn in a time of peace known as the Cold War; a 
battlefield characterized by ideological conflict and 
power politics. 
It would, however, be unjust and the perpetration 
of a farce to attempt to blame the Cold War, or even the 
German phase alone, entirely on French obstructionism, for 
that struggle is also a culmination of many other factors. 
By the same token it would be unjust to blame only France 
for her obstructive activities and their results. The 
French were obsessed with two basic desires: national 
security and a return to greatness. These desires, to 
them, warranted priority above all else, and any method 
that would attain them was justified. 
The Soviet Union must accept a share of t he respon-
sibility, as must Great Britain and the United States. 
~e Soviets, although recognizing the overriding desires 
that motivated the French, failed to meet the French on 
a basis of equality. The contempt acquired for France 
in the opening phase of the war remained evident in the 
Soviet attitude. They opposed French participation in 
discussions and negotiations which the French considered 
important to their future . Consequently, not only did the 
Soviets continue to remind France of her humiliating posi-
tion, but Russia became the symbol of a new threat to 
R U.:,·. 1 L y ONLY 
French national security. 
Great Britain and the United States, however, must 
accept a greater share of the burden of responsibility 
than the Soviet Union. Of the three great powers, they, 
more than the Soviets, should have understood the French, 
an ally of longstandinB and a nation with which they had 
much in common. Moreover, Great Britain, and later the 
United States, had been the prime supporters of French 
rights. Yet, both powers failed to provide support when 
it was needed most. Both agreed to exclude the French 
from Potsdam, for no apparent reason other than that it 
would make the course of the conference less difficult. 
!'-fay the question be posed, "Where and when was a better 
time and place to dispell existing policy differences?" 
Furthermore, as supporters of France, the two powers 
neglected to successfully represent the French views at 
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the conference. This aspect of the failure resulted 
largely from the fact that the American and British Govern-
ments never successfully reconcilled the differences which 
existed between their policies and that of the French. It 
might be added that these policy differences have never 
been eradicated. As a final point of failure, the two 
powers failed to convince the Soviets that France was not 
their satellite. Hence, the Soviets believed, at least 
they expressed the belief, that the French obstructive 
activity took place with the approval, if not the 
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encouragement of, Great Britain and the United States. 
A complex pattern of distrust and suspicion resulted 
which precipitated a breakdown of positive measures of 
cooperative action. The immediate result was that rather 
than approaching the occupation of defeated Germany as a 
cooperative project, each Allied power approached its own 
zone as a national project. Unity and coordination of aims 
became memories. The long-range effect becomes difficult 
to detect, because each succeeding event added to the 
pattern. Still, the influence is discernible. The Berlin 
wall constitutes a symbol of mockery to the joint control 
designed at Potsdam. Less tangible, but possibly more 
important, is the lack of unity among the Western powers. 
Both the wall and the lack of unity are, in part, the 
result of the French obstructionism following the German 
surrender. 
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